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Opposition to impact criteria stems from disciplines wanting
to retain their own systems of quality control and their
distinctive identities.
The inclusion of impact measurement in the 2014 REF has generated anxiety and unease for
academics, especially those in the humanities. This anxiety is connected to the university’s
need to preserve disciplinary autonomy writes Jon Adams , who considers how impact passes
a crucial element of control out of the hands of the departments, and into the hands of the
public.
Among academics, there is apparently a widespread resistance to governmental
assessment. The decision to include ‘impact’ as part of  the 2014 Research Excellence
Framework has been met with a special degree of  scorn and derision.
Alongside the worry that some disciplines will be better equipped to f ulf ill these new obligations, there is
also a particular concern that including ‘impact’ as a criterion will inevitably lead to vulgarization – either in
the modern vernacular sense of  debasement through skewing to prurience, or in the only slightly less
snooty Victorian sense of  sharing rarif ied thought with the vulgate.
Still, not everyone seems so concerned, and we can probably inf er f rom the silence of  medical researchers,
petrochemists, legal scholars, and engineers a quiet conf idence in their ability to score well on the new
criteria. It is, af ter all, easier to imagine and to measure impacts proceeding f rom engineering or medical
research – their productions are intended to execute tangible goals. In other words, impacts are not an
incidental f eature of  the work they do in the universit ies but their primary aim.
It is the humanities (and to a lesser extent, the social sciences) that have been most vocal in their
protestations, and because they f eel most vulnerable. Measuring of  any kind requires quantif ication, and
the work of  the humanities is usually held to be inimical to the types of  reduction that quantif ication
requires. The humanities are notoriously dif f icult to assess – a macro- level dif f iculty that runs all the way
down to the f uzzy marking of  undergraduate essays and exams.
 
A threat to the constitution of universit ies?
The ways in which the humanities have articulated their anxieties about the REF 2014 are actually quite
interesting f or other disciplines, and point to ways in which the resistance to assessment generally and to
impact, in particular, emerges f rom principles f undamental to the constitution of  the modern university.
Stef an Collini’s 2009 response to the announcement that impact would be included as part of  the next
assessment exercise is exemplary f or my purposes. Collini is derisive about impact, especially its
applicability to the humanities. He concludes, as such arguments of ten do, with a f oundationalist assertion
that the value of  the humanities is self -evident and irreducible.
Collini’s more particular concern is that impact is an external measure – it records successes that have
occurred outside the discipline. Understanding this is important f or understanding the special objection
impact elicits. An academic who is being measured by external values (televisual popularity, f or example) has
ef f ectively slipped the regulatory yoke of  the discipline he or she nominally represents.
It ’s a worry because participation in public engagement is vetted by systems of  assessment that intersect
only incidentally (if  at all) with those used by the disciplines themselves, and in so doing, bypass the
universit ies’ own mechanisms of  quality control. In other words, you needn’t be an especially good
practit ioner to be a good populariser.
Part of  the anxiety surrounding the impact criterion stems f rom exactly this sense that external f orces will
be allowed to intrude on the universit ies’ in-house systems of  quality assessment. Not only this, but by
ef f ectively f orcing public engagement, the impact criterion severs the sort of  independence f rom the
market- f orces of  public engagement that previously kept the knowledge productions of  academics saf e
f rom capture and distortion by the vicissitudes of  populism and current af f airs.
The worry is that an academic who is encouraged to appeal to a large number of  people will begin to make
deliberately provocative statements. Like many complainants, Collini expects impact will act as an incentive
to undignif ied behaviour. He pointedly calls this “hustling and hawking.” Underlying these complaints is an
abiding sense that the wrong people were being privileged by the RAE and that the REF will – by adding this
new impact criterion – only exacerbate that problem.
Collini is well aware that the REF’s ult imate goal is f unding allocation, and recognizes that the purpose of
scoring departments is to allocate resources equitably, such that the “highest-scoring departments then
receive a greater share of  the f unding.” The idea that only peer-review matters, the f etishisation of  that
idea, provides a consoling buf f er against the greater exposure and salaries available to journalists and
thinktank employees and R&D people doing superf icially similar work outside the universit ies. And f or those
subject to it, talking-up the strictness of  peer-review is a complement ref lexively paid to yourself .
University systems of quality control lead to distinctive identit ies
This goes some way to accounting f or why impact in particular is so vilif ied. But it also points to why
assessment generally is unpopular. Individual disciplines want to retain their own systems of  quality control
because that is how they maintain their distinctive identit ies. This idea, in essence, is the f oundation of  the
principle of  disciplinary autonomy, which is the right of  each f ield to def ine its own tenets of  success. In the
absence of  an overarching theory of  knowledge and vocabulary capable of  mediating between disciplines,
individual disciplines set their own epistemic standards. Disciplinary autonomy allows individual disciplines to
decide what counts as a good idea, and who is a good thinker.
In the main, that system works perf ectly well. It works to insulate disciplines f rom the imperialism of
neighbouring disciplines (it stops economists f rom telling sociologists they’re doing it all wrong), and in so
doing it allows a healthy methodological pluralism to f lourish.
How does one compare a physicist with a legal theorist with a literary crit ic? However invidious that
question might seem, in the absence of  even a rough answer, it ’s not clear how we should decide how much
support economics departments should receive in relation to departments of  biochemistry or history. Given
that this sort of  ranking is exactly what f unding bodies at the governmental level are required to do, we
have a better sense of  why the assessment systems (generally) are so unpopular.
There is here a f undamental tension between the demands of  disciplinary autonomy – which seeks to obey
only internal criteria, and the demands of  centralised f unding to generate metrics capable of  arbitrating
between achievements in widely disparate f ields. It is a tension between the need f or governments to have
some means of  allocating f inite resources equitably, and the need f or disciplines to be independent of
trans-disciplinary metrics.
So the complaint isn’t simple protectionism as such – it ’s not just that universit ies shouldn’t have to
compete on these grounds, it ’s the requirement that this crucial tenet of  academic self - rule be
surrendered.The worry, so f ar as I can make out, is that impact passes a crucial element of  control out of
the hands of  the departments, and into the hands of , well: you.
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